Good-bye to an Alter-Ego-Problem

By Shozo Ohmori
Translated by Takenori Noumi
and Lee Ristow

1 A Short History of an Alter-Ego-Problem
'I know how he feels', 'I don't know what he thinks'. How and when did these usual and banal expressions become a problem? I don't know. My guess is that it came from psychology not from philosophy. Every standard psychology text book writes that a flag-holder of American behaviouristic psychology, Watson, put his assertion's foundation on this problem. From this starting point, it was split into two: one is experimental psychology that flourished to be abused as a 'psychology of rats', the other is the fact that the name 'alter-ego-problem' was registered in philosophy.
The core of this problem is the fact that this was made to be a problem. Because only philosophers (including psychologists and sociologists) think it a problem and any usual healthy people don't think so, or they are puzzled by being told that it is a problem. 'We don't know of course all of the other's mind. But we can guess it more or less. What problem exists more than this?' They will say.
But this is the very problem for philosophers. 'Guess more or less'? No, we cannot at all guess on another's mind. For on what grounds? And how can we judge our guess to be true or not? After these cross examinations, the above mentioned answer of ordinary people will be diagnosed as an 'analogy theory', and will be subject to scrutiny.
Of course any normal person will admit that his guess about another's mind is only a guess at random. And being asked whether the guess at random can be judged true or not, he will be at a loss. After being at a loss, if his reply is 'the judgement is not possible', his guess will be sentenced to be no guess and not valid. And if his reply is 'the judgement can be done by the other's gesture or response to the matters in question', the name of the desease will be reclassified from 'analogy theory' to 'behaviourism'. So all the ordinary people must be sent to hospital in the name of either 'analogy theory' or 'behaviourism'.
In the meantime philosophy has attached importance to language. And so this philosophical problem was requested to be levelled up. From the level of the fact to the level of the meaning. That is, from the level of asking: 'what is in fact the other's sentiment?', to the level of asking: what is the meaning of saying 'His sentiment is such and such'.
In this way the modern philosophical 'alter-ego-problem' was formally given birth. To repeat, it is the question: Do I really know what I mean when I say, 'He is angry', 'He feels pain', or 'He is hungry'? Expressed thus, usual people may laugh and say, 'Oh, what is it? You are kidding'. But at the back of this banal and usual question, a serious problem is connected: 'What is the relation of I and others?' Especially what is the relation of I and my intimate friend? or I and my wife, I and my sons and daughters, I and my parents? These are questions we cannot only laugh at. Do we really know them? To what degree do we understand them? What do we know about them? Doubts come up one after another. And in general, to what degree is it possible for human beings to understand other human beings? And beyond possibility to what actual degree?
Through montain after mountain of questions, we clearly see an iron law. The iron law, that is, we cannot share our experience with others. Because as long as 'I' is 'I' and others are others, for me to share experience with others is a logical contradiction. So even Sham Twin Brothers who share the large and the small intestines, the elder brother cannot co-experience the youger brother's stomach-ache. Because logically they are each another person. By the same reason, even if some device to connect my brain with other person's brain were invented, I would never be able to share his experience. Again logically, each of our experiences is totally unique. Every person, without exception, is alone with four iron walls.
So, if we say anything about another person's experience, we are trespassing this logical loneliness. We are saying something we don't know anything about. Can we do such a thing? If we can, how? This is the very problem of the alter-ego in philosophy.

2 Unsuccessful Trials: Analogy Theorem and Behaviourism
The above mentioned 'loneliness with four iron walls' makes the analogy theorem blurred and washed out, although it first common-sensically looked very natural. To guess another's mind with the reference of my own mind is far from possible. The stomach-ache of another person is not accessible however hard we strech our hand. Psychologists knew and were troubled by this problem far before than philosophers. How can they check their experimental subject's reaction to be true or not true? For example, a dog's, a cat's, or a monkey's reaction? No. Even in the case of human beings, how can psychologists check their testimony, especially their introspection; that is, testimony by memory? So the question arose: Is psychology science? Because it lacked objective verification which is indespensable for the construction of science. So, as long as they wanted psychology to be ranked as science, mental experience such as introspection must be rejected and only behaviour, which can be checked true or false objectively, should be investigated. In this way the arising of 'behaviourism' became the natural course of its development. Philosophical 'behaviourism', the origin of which is surely psychological behaviourism, was, however, well aware of the difference of linguistic level. That is, psychological behaviourism treated behaviour at the level of fact, whereas philosophical behaviourism did it at the level of meaning. The most serious motivation of behaviourism at the level of meaning was to transcend 'loneliness with four iron walls' and to form meaning concerning the mental experience of another person. The method of this formation was, as we can easily guess, almost the same as in the case of psychological behaviourism. Mental experience of others, for example: 'He has a stomach-ache.' is defined by the ensemble of actions accompanied by the stomach-ache (for example: groans, putting a hand on one's belly, etc.) Given such a definition, it is true that 'loneliness with four iron walls' at once disappears. But this disappearance itself means that it averts the most serious problem, doesn't it? The problem was what is the mental experience of other person? This definition averts it and only says that it is the ensemble of behaviours which are never mental experience. This is why, I believe, Wittgenstein, although coming very near to behaviourism, didn't stay there.

3 Husserl's Breakdown
If I name here Wittgenstein as a philosopher who was troubled by the alter-ego-problem, I could never omit the name of Husserl, either. He treats this problem in the book 'Cartesian Reflection' or in the lecture 'Danger', which are not accessible for me because of the author's apparent difficulty or hesitation in describing one step after another. Fortunately, we have in Japan a first class historian of philosophy Wataru Hiromatsu, who died a premature death last year. He left us a book 'A View Concerning Husserl's Behaviourism'. (Seido-sha 1994 'Husserl Gensho-gaku e no Shikaku') which criticises Husserl's alter-ego-problem. I shall rely on the Husserl described by Hiromatsu.
The alter-ego-problem which troubled Husserl and Wittgenstein even in their later years who actually led the philosophy of twentieth century thought, has a peculiar characteristic which troubles almost every philosophical 'problem'. The peculiar characteristic is the fact that it only troubles philosophers and never troubles usual people. Such as 'the same', 'ego', 'freedom', etc. have the same characteristic.
But why does it trouble philosophers? Weren't they once also usual people who were not troubled by it? Then why? Because, I believe, they don't want to be easily persuaded. So the best way to persuade them is to observe in minute detail how usual people are not troubled by it. And I named this method, 'Simulation of the Meaning Reproduction'.
As a starting point of my discussion, I chose the place where Husserl brokedown. His method may be the most philosophical and so the very reverse of the way usual people take. So the best way for me is to stop at the point where he failed and to go back just in the reverse direction.
According to his own words, ('Cartesian Reflection', especially Fifth Reflection) what he aimed was the 'Construction of alter-ego in the conscience of lonely ego', and accoding to Hiromatsu, it is, to say briefly, a construction of the alter-ego under the principle of empathy. It is a trial from penance to forcible breakthrough against the 'loneliness with four iron walls' which Wittgenstein tried and failed to overcome. The linguistic equipment Husserl prepared for this was, not exaggeratingly speaking, that of climbing the Himalayas. It couldn't help but be philosophical red tape. In order to express his idea in comprehensible form, I will have to tear off all these philosophical figurative notes and to show its bare skeleton, although this process may make earnest behaviourists angry.
Hiromatsu also drastically shortened this and made an exact summary, 'Construction of alter-ego in the conscience of lonely ego.' By this construction another person is presented to me as 'Appraesentation' (indirect presentation). What is presented not indirectly but directly (that is, 'Praesentation') is of course only my 'Eigenheitsphaere', (that is, my own experience). In the domain of my own experience, (this is also called 'Primodiale world') another person is experienced at first as a 'thing' (Koelper). 'I' myself am also a thing, which receives 'unification' as a 'Leib' (body) and where 'I' acquires a 'united body of things and mind', that is, 'I' acquires a 'spiritual and materialistic united body'. So the problem is 'to unitedly transfer' this united body of things and the mind into other Koerper and to construct a body that has just the same functions as my body functions. But this 'to unitedly transfer' is just the operation that Wittgenstein named 'to transplant' and refuted as impossible. (cf. his 'Philosophical Investigation') And Husserl nonchalantly does this decisive operation by common sensical analogy, or 'unification by analogy' based on the similarity as bodies of 'I' and other people, or 'Einfuehrung' (empathy). Husserl asserts that aforesaid 'analogical unification' or 'Einfuehrung' are never simple phenomena but a fundamental form of Passive Synthesis called Paarung (pair). But this is, I believe, only his bluff. Let's examine his work more closely. 'Two existences apparently similar (pair) vividly affect each other, and pile up each objective meaning with each other. By this operation each existence transfers meanings and within each existence meaning unification is proceeded. ... If a thing which resembles me (or a thing that surely will make a phonomenal pair with my body) appears to me in its peculiar way, the other Koerper must inevitably receive the meaning of the body within the process of piling up meanings.' I don't think that this long lecture is persuasive. I see in it only his agony and his frustration. Hiromatsu rows upstream in the drift of Husserl's thought and found his origin of the disease in his fundamental concept: 'the aspiration of conscience' which Husserl presents in 'Logic Investigation' or 'Iden'. And Hiromatsu sentences the diagnosis, 'Here is the apolia of Husserl's all epistemology. From such an origin his alter-ego epistemology is also destined to be blocked. With this apolia, theoretically he can never escape from the soliptic circulus vitiosus.'

4 Easy Way of Ordinary People
I see philosophical nonsense in Husserl's frustration. Don't you? What is his overwhelming intellectual trial? (Surely it is even now overwhelming us.) And what is his discouraging frustration? Ordinary people never care of and never need his intellectual trial. Every day and every hour they deal with alter-ego very easily. Isn't this the Buridin's ass of Scolastic comic? Philosophically and logically the ass can never choose and never eat from which of the two mangers. But actually he eats to his heart content and gets plump like a dumpling. Don't you just chuckle over this comical schema?
So, if I try to disentangle philosophically this contradiction, I shall only have to repeat the absurdity that Husserl tried. I do want to repeat not the exaggeration Husserl constructed but what ordinary people who nonchalantly walk in the street usually do. The process I want to imitate is the path ordinary peaple follow when they actually deal with an alter-ego problem. I call this process, 'Simulation of Meaning Reproduction'. However easy the process I reproduce may seem, the aim is the same as the hard process Husserl tried. I have to reproduce (Husserl used the word 'construct') the meaning of another person's experience (especially his mental experience): 'He is sad' or 'He has a stomach-ache' in the form that I can understand. The foundation on which it may be reproduced should be none other than my own experience. Husserl and anology theory both were aware of it. The foundation is the same. Why did he fail, then? Because, I believe, of his ambitious intention to theorize philosophically an operation that ordinary people most easily carry out. As is always the tradition of Western philosophy, Husserl also invented in vain vacuous terms: 'self-proper-domain' or 'pair-ize', which resulted in deceiving Husserl himself. Simplicity is the core of this problem. Ordinary people never reason. They only say and think: 'My mother has a stomach-ache.' or 'My daughter is glad.' I say, 'Meaning Reproduction'. But I would have to feel ashamed to exaggerate so. Ordinary people are so simple or naive. Ordinary people, seeing others, without any particular intention think 'He may have stomach-ache' or 'She may be sad.' Of course similarity with others or 'pair-ization' that Husserl defined may motivate it. But no motivation is necessary. Not any reason is necessary. For ordinary people, thinking without any reason at all is enough. Because it is for them an attempt at trial and error.
What is this 'attempt'? It is a replacement of the subject 'I' to 'mother' or 'daughter' in the sentence 'I have a stomach-ache' or 'I am glad'. This replacement is the attempt. I want to name the sentence whose subject is replaced from 'I' to 'others': 'Subject replaced sentence from I to others'. Because it is just the parallel of what Husserl asserted: 'Unification of my body-self becomes the model when I unify other existence as a body'. And so, it has also the same difficulty as Husserl's 'loneliness with four iron walls'. It doesn't have any meaning if left as it is. The sentence before the replacement had a clear and vivid meaning, because the subject was 'I'. But the sentence after the replacement doesn't yet have meaning. To reproduce meaning for this sentence is the aim of this thesis.

5 Reproduction of Meaning by the Axiom System
I repeat here that my aim is to give clear meaning e.g. for the sentence 'My mother has a stomach-ache'. Until the reproduction of this meaning, all the 'Subject replaced sentences from I to others' are left being as nonsense. This is what is grammatically called the 'past subjunctive mood', and is inevitably required by 'loneliness with four iron walls'. In fact, ordinary people use freely these sentences with the understood meaning. So if only I reproduce the meaning that ordinary people use, the contradiction is disentangled.
Reflecting as an ordinary man on the meaning I understand by a 'Subject replaced sentence', I can confirm the following two characteristics: (A) I understand the other's experience to be very similar to the corresponding experience that I once had. (B) my judgement 'true or false' to the proposition made by the other's experience is done mainly on account of the other's behaviour including his linguistic reaction.
It is at once seen that (A) is analogy theory and that (B) is nothing but behaviourism. Then in order to reproduce meaning for the 'Subject replaced sentence' it is necessary to include both: analogy theory and behaviourism. Husserl's understanding of the other's experience also includes these two. 'Leib (body) unification of oneself becomes the model when unifying the other Kaerper and the Kaerper of oneself as a Leib' is analogy theory (A), and 'Verification of the other's experience is done only by a new Apresation (indirect presentation) that passed comprehensively and harmoniously' as behaviourism (B), although we need some decipherment.
Let's dispense with Husserl's complicated concept devices, and let's construct, in the easiest and clearest way, meaning; including both (A) and (B). From the point of view of (A), my own experience comes first. So let's analyse, for example, the proposition 'I have a stomach-ache'. Then from the point of view of (B), there are a group of behaviouristic propositions whose subject is 'I', such as 'I groan and place a hand on my stomach', 'I say that I feel pain in the stomach', 'I grimace in pain', etc. According to my experience, these propositions are all true if the original experience proposition 'I have a stomach-ache' is true. I call this 'empirical law'. So I express it by logical implication (< ). Schematically it can be written using ensemble, "behaviouristic proportions" < "original empirical proposition". I name this ensemble 'meaning axioms'; considering the case of geometric axioms. (R. Carnap once used a name 'meaning postulates'.)
My intention is to transfer these 'meaning axioms' to the case of the other person. To replace the subject 'I' to some others (ex. you, he, she, a dog, etc.) is the only process I need. I name this process 'transfer from I to others'. The experience proposition of other person, for example 'my mother has a stomach-ache', is defined by the 'meaning axioms' whose subject is transferred from 'I' to 'my mother'.
My intention can be easily regarded. In Euclidian geometry, 'point', 'line', etc. are defined by an axiom system. In the same way, 'My mother has a stomach-ache' is defined by the 'meaning axiom system'.
I shall have to provide some additional explanations. Firstly, almost all of the elements of a 'meaning axiom system' are propositions that can be publicly observed and so can be judged empirically true or false. By each of the judgements the truthfulness of the experience proposition including the axiom system will be enforced or weakened. Sometimes the existence of falsehood of only one axiom completely destroys the truthfulness of the proposition. It is clearly seen that the process of the judgement of each axiom is nothing but a semantic expression of behaviourism itself. In other words, this axioms sytem is a weakened expression of behaviourisms that are 'empirically verifiable'.
Let's apply this to the above mentioned other's experience proposition: 'My mother has a stomach-ache'. Before and after I make this sentence, she produced various behaviours that concern the axioms included in the experience proposition. Some of them are judged to be true (fulfilled), others not. Then the final vote whether the judgement is true or not should be made myself. I may sometimes regard as important the axioms that were judged to be true and totally believe her having stomach-ache. Other times I may regard as important the axioms that were judged to be false and think that she only pretends to be ill. This is a process full of twists and turns. Husserl expressed a part of this process very clumsily: It proceeds comprehensively, impartially and harmonically.
We are all exercising this judging process in each of our lives. It varies from suspecting hatred of a stranger to supposing a joy of the dog we keep. By experiencing innumerable judgements of various 'experience propositions of others', each of us fixes his overall attitude toward 'experience proposition of others'. Of course it depends also on his native character and on the condition of his life. So this overall attitude varies from the naiveness of a young mother toward her baby to a doubtful distrust of long deceived and ill-treated old man. It has a wide and varied spectrum. People, having applied new axiom systems in various cases and being influenced by other people, modify and adjust their own axiom systems. Some may apply it only to people, others to any animals and plants, or to their own cars, robots or computers. Sometimes they delete some axioms from an 'experience proposition of others', insert other new axioms, or change the ranking of importance between axioms. The process of this influencing each other in human lives produces social meaning of 'experience proposition of others'. The meaning thus mutually adjusted is transferred to children in schools or in families. This, so to speak, 'socially admitted' public meaning of 'experience proposition of others' is not uniformly defined, just as the meaning of 'marriage' or 'three meals a day'. It has statistically Gaussian distribution the stable centre part of which is generally used and each of us has a special judgement point with certain deviations. So generally speaking, just as in the case of the meaning of a usual word, it varies according to period, races, and status in society. And in case of the same person also, it changes according to his age and his circumstances.

6 Conceptual Meaning of 'Experience Proposition of Others'
The essential characteristic of the meaning of 'experience proposition of others' which has been historically constructed in our everyday lives, is that it is conceptual, whereas the meaning of 'experience proposition of mine' is perceptual. If I use Husserl's term, whereas the meaning of 'my stomach-ache' is a well-known pain and has 'Erfuellung' (fulfills) my perception, 'his stomach-ache', although being illustrated with my own stomach-ache, can only conceptually be understood. This is nothing other than the reflection of what I called 'loneliness with four iron walls' which is the fundamental and logical isolation of myself from others. The pain of other people doesn't hurt nor tickle me. (Translator's note: Japanese expression 'itakumo kayukumo nai' is 'I don't feel it at all'.) Or, I must say that the meaning of another's pain cannot be conceived by me how it is perceived. Here I will have to explain the difference between perception and conception.
For English empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, length or form of something very small that cannot be felt were not understandable. An example was 'a particle of the animal spirit of a louse's blood'. Modern example is 'double spiral of DNA'. They are too small to be felt or seen. So it cannot be understood perceptively. Being at a loss Berkeley and Hume seem to have escaped from this problem. The only remedy to disentangle this trouble is to understand it conceptually. For example to admit that one micron can only be understood conceptually: to understand it as one ten thousandth of one centimeter which can be perceived. And this is the understanding we actually have. For the illustration of what I mean by 'conceptual understanding', I add other examples. Very short time, eg, one thousandth of one milisecond, very slow speed, eg, some centimeters a year of movement of ocean floor, elevation of Himalaya, growth of man's beard, movement of a short hand of a watch, on the contrary, very fast speed, eg, three hundred thousand kilometer per second of light's speed, or very long distance, eg, 30 or 40 thousand light-years. And almost all mathematical concepts, eg, natural number, Euclidian line, etc. have only conceptual meaning. Above all, I must underline the example of transfinite ordinal number ,
, , ......... Because the meaning of this is conceptual and is constructed by the relation of finite natural numbers. (Translator's note: natural number is not finite. So the author would have to find other expression.) So the axiomatic isomorphism of my stomach-ache which is perceptive and another's stomach-ache which is only conceptual would be illustrated by this example. The jumping from finite to infinite would also illustrate the jumping from 'loneliness with four iron walls' to another person.
Some of you may feel unfamiliar hearing the explanation: conceptual meaning by 'axiomatic systems' of meaning? To them I shall point out that in mathematics, begining from Euclidian geometry, all the concepts are constructed by an axiom system. Then some of you may again say, 'Isn't it restricted only in mathematics?' I shall answer them that they are, without their knowledge, utilizing axiom systems according to the model of mathematics. For example, those who understand the conceptual meaning of 'area' must know that the 'area' of two schemas is the sum of the 'area' of each shema, or that the area of a rectangle is the product of the length of two adjacent sides. Even if you cannot explicitly express it like in a geometric textboook, the understanding of the meaning of 'area' is nothing but an understanding of these axioms. In fact, 'stomach-ache of another person' is a theoretical concept, such as atoms, electromagnetic waves, exploitation and productivity are. These are all understood by axiom systems. (I cannot discuss it here, but my opinion is that 'ego' and 'the past' also belong to theoretical concepts.)
'That's enough. Your talk bored me stiff. We have had enough of conceptual meaning or axiom systems. We are asking you what is the meaning of another's stomach-ache.' I hear your grumble.
My answer to it is simple. 'You know it already. What is the use of asking what you already know.'
Because every one of us uses 'experience proposition of others' in his usual everyday life without hesitation. This usual usage shows that he knows its meaning. When physicists use the words quark, twenty six dimension, or superstring, that we cannot make head or tail of, they surely know the meaning of them. Students of middle or high schools learn somehow or other 'point without dimension', or 'line without any width' in geometry, in the process of being troubled by examinations. The same can be said about another's stomach-ache, another's pleasure or sadness which transcends our own experience. We understand them conceptually. Those who use Japanese language inevitably understand the conceptual meaning of it. So those who ask seriously what the meaning of the experience proposition of another know in fact the answer of what they are asking.

7 Cud Chewing
The above is a simulation I propose of how a very ordinary modern human being produces the meaning of experience propostions of others. It may not be a total waste of labour to look back with a view to the reproduction process of the meaning of 'the experience proposition of others'. First, what effect does this meaning production give to an 'alter-ego-problem' in philosophical history?
A very simple doubt gave birth to the alter-ego-problem. A doubt, that is, what do I mean when I speak about other's mind? Because in fact I don't know anything about it. To this doubt behaviourism tried to answer that the meaning is qualitatively different from the original one. The meaning of my experience is known directly to me. Whereas the meaning of the experience proposition of others is 'an ensemble of behaviours'. But the other's behaviours (gloomy face, grimace or way of talking) are understandable to me because they are in my perception domain. This behaviourism attracted, from Wittgenstein down, many philosophers. But I feel it has a fatal flaw. What I call fatal is that ordinary people in our real society do not adopt behaviourism. They never think that another's mind is an ensemble of behaviours. They simply believe that other people think as they do. Analogy theory faithfully follows this ordinary people's common sense. But its logical contradiction was evident to anyone.
The meaning reproduction I have now dealt with is, so to speak, a synthesized method of these two avoiding the faults of each.
I repeat here the process to create meaning. First, I transferred isomorphically propositions concerning 'I' into 'the other' mechanically. (Transfer of 'I' to 'the other') With this, 'I' of behaviour propositions accompanied with the experience proposition was also transferred to 'the other'. It may be clear to everyone that this transfer is constructed with the same parallelism as the transfer in the case of behaviourism.
But I don't understand yet 'the experience proposition of others' I have thus just made. It is incomprehensible. To make it understandable, I must adopt some mode that is different from the perceptive mode by which I understand my experience. The meaning of the experience proposition that I have newly made is conceptual, not perceptive meaning. What I call conceptual meaning is the meaning that can only conceptually be understood. I note here that very small things such as atoms are also only conceptually understandable, although they are not thought so as they have perceptive illustration such as small balls.
This qualitative difference, conceptual and perceptive, is expressed in other words; 'unsymmetry' or 'loneliness with four iron walls'. My stomach-ache and another's stomach-ache have different meanings and are understandable by differernt modes. But reversely saying, if this difference of understanding modes is admitted, another's mind is said to be understandable to me and those four iron walls that make us lonely can melt. In other words, another's mind is a kind of theoretical concept. By the way, the fundamental two concepts 'ego' and 'past' are, in my opinion, also theoretical concepts. I have no space here to discuss it. But if I could, the discussion would help you understand more easily that which I assert.
Behind the rupture of 'I' and others, which is the very reflection of a difference of perceptive and conceptual meanings, there is an unmistakable similarity between 'I' and others. 'Paarung', 'analogical unification', 'Appraesentation' and other clumsy, exaggerated terms Husserl invented came from this unmistakable similarity of 'I' and others. In my 'meaning construction' case, it is direct and simple. And automatical transfer from 'I' to others when making a meaning axiom system presuposes, of course, the similarity of 'I' and others. And you will easily admit that this meaning axiom system is a basis of the verification (of truth or false) of 'experience proposition of others' that behaviourism requires.
Thus, my meaning construction is built by non-pathological parts of the two: analogy theory and behaviourism.
My meaning reproduction lacks the justification or reasoning philosophers usually require. This lacking is intentional. I didn't think it necessary. When usual people use meaning propositions, they don't think it necessary to be careful of its philosophical reasoning or its logical justification. Without reason, we use the meaning. It is an attempt. Then the person who was applied the meaning or the third persons react to it linguistically or behaviouristically. If the reaction was what we expected, that is, most of the behaviour propositions of meaning axiom systems were checked true, then we will be encouraged and will continue to use the meaning. But if the reaction was contrary to our expectation, that is, an axiom system was not checked true, then we will revise some of the behaviour propositions of meaning in the axiom system. Sometimes other people may suggest us to revise them, or we may ask other people how to revise them. Or in the worst case, other people may react as if they heard some foreign language. ('other people' include animals such as dogs or cats and furniture etc.) Then after that, we may totally stop using the axiom system or stop applying it to some particular object. Each member of the society acuumulates experience of such usage of meaning and influences others or is influenced by others. Thus, just like stones in a torrent become round by being scrubbed by each other, the meaning of another's mind is formed into an average, standard, or stabilized meaning, or is deleted. This trial and error is the actual process of meaning production.
We have succeeded and are now actually using the thus produced 'meaning of another's mind'. We have so practiced and mastered the meaning that it has now acquired the existence that I named 'story existence'. When we think or talk about another's pain, agony or pleasure, we mean the pain, the agony or the pleasure that actually exists. I don't repeat here about the 'story existence'. I discussed it minutely in my 'Time and Existence'.
I vaguely understand why the 'alter-ego-problem' was a problem when I orient it in the 'bird's eye view picture' that I have just drawn. Vaguely ... yes, I only vaguely estimate as if it were an estimate of a seismic center which seismologists do, or worse than this. With this bad accuracy, the seismic center, I suppose, of the 'alter-ego-problem' is mistaking character of meaning of 'experience proposition of others'. Whereas the meaning of another's mind is, as stated above, conceptual like various concepts of mathematics, it was taken as having a perceptive meaning. We have rare exceptions of Mill or Duelkhem to understand mathematics or logics psychologically, I find it difficult to mistake, as those two did, the sum of three angles of a triangle is two right angles or five plus seven equals twelve as 'movement of mind' (perception). But I find it very natural to mistake other's mind as perceptive meaning. It is very strange that Wittgenstein himself made this mistake. All the more strange that his principal idea is a 'language game', and what I developed here as meaning construction is a kind of 'language game'. Concerning Husserl, he changed his position from psychologist to logician. So he must have known well the danger of psychology. And he was well known as a platonist having once been a mathematician. It is very strange that Husserl was trapped in the snare of percetive meaning. I will ask and wait for many behaviourists to study and clear its reason.
Anyway we can say good bye to the 'alter-ego-problem' once we recognized that another's mind is conceptual not perceptive. But it may surely be a short good bye. The problem will arise again in no time. In philosophy, those who laugh last seem to be always 'problems' themselves.

up to page 13 1997 6 26 Noumi
up to page 13 1999 7 18 Lee